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THE "RIGHT" TO A NEUTRAL AND
COMPETENT JUDGE IN OHIO'S MAYOR'S
COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio mayor's courts are often an unknown entity, but the
estimated 545 mayor's courts' have an impact on the quality of justice
available in Ohio. The mayor's court is a court of inferior jurisdiction
in which the mayor, by virtue of his office, has the authority to decide
cases involving misdemeanors occurring within the municipality. As
an elected municipal official, the mayor is responsible for the man-
agement of municipal affairs.2 Since the mayor is also responsible,
directly or indirectly, for fiscal affairs, the chance to increase the
village coffers through fines resulting from convictions could be a real
temptation. Thus, there is an inherent conflict of interest between the
executive and judicial roles of a mayor-judge, which prevents him
from being a "neutral and detached" magistrate as required by due
process of law.3
The mayor's court may decide a variety of cases ranging from
petty crimes, such as a speeding violation, to serious offenses, such
as driving while intoxicated. A variety of legal issues may be involved
in a misdemeanor trial. The resolution of these issues may mean the
difference between an acquittal and a conviction, with the resulting
loss of property and possible loss of liberty for the accused. The
proper determination of these issues often requires the legal training
of the mayor-judge. Therefore, it is essential that the requirements
of a fair trial be implemented at a criminal hearing in mayor's court.
If the accused is tried by a mayor who has no legal training, it may
be impossible to afford the accused a fair trial, thus denying the
accused the right to due process of law.
II. THE MAYOR'S COURT SYSTEM IN OHIO
According to an unpublished memorandum of the Ohio State
Bar Foundation, the typical mayor's court is located in a rural village
with a population of 3,000 to 5,000 persons, conducts judicial hear-
ings on a regular basis (weekly or biweekly), has an average caseload
I Interview with Thomas Swisher, Director of Research of the Ohio State Bar Foundation,
in Columbus, Ohio, January 21, 1975.
2 See text accompanying note 28, infra.
3 Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972).
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of 435 cases a year, and collects approximately $11,800 a year from
fines levied by the mayor.4
The mayor's court is created by the authority of the General
Assembly of Ohio to establish statutory courts as set forth in the
Ohio constitution.' The General Assembly has provided by a statute
that the mayor of a municipality may hear and decide cases involving
violations of municipal ordinances and violations of the state traffic
code occurring on state highways located within the municipality, if
that municipality does not have a police court and is not the site of a
municipal court.' The mayor can preside over a variety of cases
ranging from minor traffic offenses to serious misdemeanors, but the
types of offenses heard by the mayor are subject to certain restric-
tions. If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the charge and he
pleads not guilty, the mayor cannot hear the case unless the defendant
waives his right to trial by jury.7
III. THE MAYOR'S INHERENT PECUNIARY INTEREST IN OBTAINING
CONVICTIONS
The first constitutional defect of the mayor's courts is the inher-
ent pecuniary interest the mayor has in obtaining convictions, thus
preventing him from being a "neutral and detached" judge as re-
quired by due process of law. The United States Supreme Court has
established certain guidelines which are related to the judicial admin-
istration of the mayor's courts.
In 1927 the Court decided the leading case of Tumey v. Ohio,'
in which the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor and subse-
quently convicted and fined by the mayor of North College Hill,
Ohio. A portion of the mayor's salary was derived from the fines he
levied in the mayor's court. The Court held that the practice of
allowing part of the mayor's salary to be dependent on whether or
Interview with Thomas Swisher, Director of Research of the Ohio State Bar Foundation,
in Columbus, Ohio, January 21, 1975.
- Ohio Const. art. IV, § I provides that "the judicial power of the state is vested in a
supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas ... and such other courts inferior
to the supreme court as may from time to time be established by law."
6 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1905.01 (Page 1968). A conviction for violation of a municipal
ordinance can lead to a prison term of up to six months and a fine of up to one thousand dollars,
UPPER ARLINGTON, OHIO, CODE § 501.09 (1968).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.08 (Page 1975). A further restriction, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.17 (Page 1975) is that "[alt any trial, in any court, for the violation of any statute
...or of any ordinance of any municipal corporation, except in cases in which the penalty
involved does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars, the accused has the right to be tried by
a jury."
9 273 U.S. 510 (1927), rev'g 115 Ohio St. 701, 155 N.E. 698 (1926).
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not a conviction was obtained was a violation of due process of law.9
The Court established a far-reaching rationale when it declared that
"[elvery procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the bal-
ance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies
• . . due process of law." 10
A year after the Tumey decision the Court decided Dugan v.
Ohio." Dugan involved the Xenia, Ohio, mayor's court. Unlike the
situation in Tumey, the Xenia mayor had little executive power and
his salary was not dependent on fines which he imposed. The Court
found that the mayor's relation with the executive branch and his
financial interest in obtaining convictions were too remote to invoke
the Tumey rationale. 2
The Tumey rationale was again applied some forty years later
in Ward v. Monroeville. 3 As in Dugan, the Monroeville mayor's
salary was not dependent upon the fines he imposed; however, the
mayor had wide executive powers," and fines collected in mayor's
court comprised a large part of the village's revenue. 5 The Court, in
applying the Tumey "possible temptation" test to determine whether
the mayor should be disqualified," concluded that the mayor's duties
concerning village finances "may make him partisan to maintain the
high level of contribution from the mayor's court."' 7 Such a situation
clearly constituted a violation of due process of law. 8
In 1973 the Ohio supreme court in State ex rel. Brockman v.
Proctor9 confronted the issue of the constitutionality of mayor's
courts. The mayor in Brockman was a member of the community's
legislative body. He exercised little executive power, since most of the
city's executive functions were performed by an appointed city man-
ager. The Ohio court concluded that Brockman did not violate
Tumey or Ward, since the mayor in question exercised little executive
1 273 U.S. at 532.
10 Id.
" 277 U.S. 61 (1928), affg 117 Ohio St. 503, 159 N.E. 477 (1927).
12 277 U.S. at 65.
" 409 U.S. 57 (1972), rev'g 27 Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N.E.2d 757 (1971).
, Id. at 58.
"[n 1964 this income contributed $23,589.50 of total village revenues of $46,355.38; in
1965 it was $18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 it was $16,085 of $43,585.13; in 1967 it was
$20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and in 1968 it was $23,439.42 of $52,995.95." Id. at 58.
, 42 CIN. L. REv. 367, 370 (1973). See 409 U.S. at 60.
, 409 U.S. at 60.
's Id.
'9 35 Ohio St. 2d 79, 298 N.E.2d 532 (1973). See 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 856 (1974).
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power."0 The Ohio court also reasoned that the facts in Brockman and
Dugan were "exactly in point ' 21 and therefore the mayor was not
disqualified from presiding as judge in mayor's court.
The Brockman majority refused to confront directly the issue of
the existence of the mayor's courts as a violation of due process of
law. The majority opted to exercise judicial restraint, invoking the
doctrine of separation of powers: "if this court were to reach out to
declare all mayors' courts' jurisdiction to try criminal cases unconsti-
tutional it would be an unwarranted invasion of the power vested in
the General Assembly by the Constitution. 122 This quotation identi-
fies the problem concerning the Ohio mayor's courts. The Ohio
supreme court, feeling constrained by the Ohio constitution, refused
to proceed outside the specific guidelines established by the United
States Supreme Court. In turn, the General Assembly refuses to act
affirmatively because of the possible political repercussions involved
if it were to abolish part of the fiefdom of the mayor, who is often a
powerful local political figure.
Justice Corrigan, dissenting in Brockman, advocated expanding
the Tumey-Ward rationale to all Ohio mayor's courts. He said:
Once the principle is recognized that a mayor's impartiality may be
affected by the fact that monies collected in his court go into the
general operating fund of the municipality, that fact alone is suffi-
cient to disqualify him as a judicial officer presiding over the
mayor's court, irrespective of the extent to which he participates in
the management of the financial affairs of the municipality and the
percentage of the municipal revenue which is derived from his
court.?' (emphasis in the original)
The fines imposed by the mayor can be an important part of munici-
pal revenues, as demonstrated in Ward.4 If a person is charged with
a violation of a state statute and he is convicted or forfeits bail or a
deposit, the monies are paid into the county treasury; however, if a
person is charged with violation of a municipal ordinance and he is
convicted or forfeits bail or a deposit, the monies collected are paid
into the municipal treasury.25 This situation encourages the municipal
police to charge offenders with violation of municipal ordinances
whenever possible. The mayor's courts are even exempted from turn-
21 Id. at 84, 298 N.E.2d at 536.
21 Id. at 83, 298 N.E.2d at 535.
2 Id. at 84, 298 N.E.2d at 536.
3 Id. at 92, 298 N.E.2d at 540 (Corrigan, Celebrezze, and Brown, JJ., dissenting).
24 See note 15 supra.
2' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 733.40 (Page 1954).
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ing over the monies derived from the court for the maintenance of
the county law library.26 The result is that the entire amount of fines
collected in the mayor's court is used within the particular com-
munity. The village fathers of Monroeville demonstrated how im-
portant these funds were to the community when they drafted a
resolution vigorously protesting proposed state legislation reducing
the jurisdiction of the mayor's court.2?
Ohio permits a variety of forms of municipal government.21 Gen-
erally the permissible forms produce two classes of executives,
"strong" mayors and "weak" mayors. The "strong" mayor is the
chief executive of the community, and he wields a great deal of
power.29 The "weak" mayor by contrast has little direct executive
power, and he is often merely a member of the legislative body who
has been chosen as mayor by the other members of the legislative
body to perform certain ceremonial functions.31 Strictly speaking,
the Tumey-Ward rationale applies only to the "strong" mayor form
of government. Extending the Tumey-Ward rationale to the "weak"
mayor form of government is appropriate, once it is realized that the
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3375.50 (Page 1972), requires that a certain amount of monies
accrued from fines and bail forfeitures in municipal courts be paid to the trustees of the county
law library. The Ohio supreme court in Greenville Law Library Ass'n v. Ansonia, 33 Ohio St.
2d 3, 292 N.E.2d 880 (1973), decided that the statute does not apply to mayor's courts.
2 409 U.S. at 58-59 n.l. The resolution read in part that "this legislation may cause such
reduction in revenue to this village that an additional burden may result in increased taxation
and/or curtailment of services essential to the health, welfare and safety of this village."
A municipal corporation may choose to organize a charter government, OHIO CONST.
art. XVIII, § 7, in which case the duties of the mayor are determined by the charter. A non-
charter municipality may choose to organize under one of the three statutory schemes:
"commission plan", OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 705.41 (Page 1954); "city manager plan", OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 705.51 (Page 1954); or the "federal plan", OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 705.71
(Page 1954). Generally the powers of the mayor in a charter government will often be similar
to one of the three statutory schemes.
29 The "strong" mayor is usually confined to the "federal plan", OHIO REV. CoDE §705.71
(Page 1954), or to a charter city in which the mayor exercises a great deal of executive or
administrative functions.
11 The "commission plan" and the "city manager plan" or a similar type of city govern-
ment charter are the typical "weak" mayor forms of government. The "commission plan",
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 705.41 (Page 1954) provides for a commission made up of members
elected by the community. The commission as a body exercises both legislative and executive
functions. If a mayor is chosen, he is a member of the commission and is selected by the
commission to perform the ceremonial functions of the office; he is one among equals. The
"city manager plan", OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 705.51 (Page 1954), provides for the election
of council members by the community, and the council in turn hires a professional city manager
to run the day to day affairs of the community. While theoretically the council is a legislative-
executive body, it has delegated much of its executive authority to the appointed city manager.
The chairman of the council exercises the judicial functions of the office of mayor, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 705.55 (Page 1954), and he is also one among equals.
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"possible temptation" test would apply to the "weak" mayor, since
he might also be prone toward tipping the scales of justice toward
conviction. Undoubtedly, the "strong" mayor is directly concerned
with the fiscal management of the community, but the "weak" mayor
as a member of the commission or council is also responsible for
municipal fiscal affairs. The mayor's and the commissioners' chances
for re-election may often be influenced by the soundness of the mu-
nicipal fiscal policy and the time which has elapsed since the last tax
raise was imposed. The "weak" mayor might be tempted to lean
toward conviction and the resuilting revenue in order to enhance his
and his colleagues' chances for re-election because of the strong fiscal
position of the community. "Since no one commissioner. . . in...
the weak mayor forms is ultimately responsible for municipal affairs,
and each may share in making executive decisions, each of these
officials might be so concerned about municipal finances that he
would be too partial to serve as judge . . .,.
While at common law any financial interest that the judge might
have had in the outcome of the case, no matter how slight, was
enough to disqualify him, 32 such has not been the case in the United
States. The Tumey-Ward rationale requires that the disqualifying
interest must be a direct pecuniary interest and not too remote.3
The Tumey court adopted a narrow view of the potential for conflict
of interest when it held that the mere union of the executive and
judicial powers in the mayor does not per se violate due process of
law.3 4 Unfortunately the Court has yet to directly expand the
Tumey-Ward logic to find that the mayor, whether a "weak" or
"strong" mayor, has an inherent pecuniary interest in obtaining con-
victions and as a result is disqualified to act as a judicial officer in
mayor's court.
The reason for extending the rationale can be drawn from a brief
discussion of the related area of corporate affairs. A judge who is an
3, 42 CIN. L. REv. 367, 374 (1973).
' Bonham's Case, 2 Brown 225 (1610).
13 273 U.S. at 523.
3, Id. at 534. See Poynter v. Walling, 54 Del. 409, 177 A.2d 641 (1962); La Guardia v.
Smith, 288 App. Div. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1942) and Eckerson v. Des Moines, 137 Iowa
452, 115 N.W. 177 (1908), which held that the vesting of the mayor with both executive and
judicial powers was not unconstitutional. But see, Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A.
769 (1916). Cf People v. Kessler, 77 Misc. 2d 640, 354 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Suffolk County Ct.
1974), in which the court disqualified a justice of the peace from hearing a case because the
defendant was charged with violation of an ordinance enacted by a legislative council of which
the justice of the peace was a member. Contra, State v. Collins, 24 R.I. 242, 52 A. 990 (1902);
State v. Wright, 81 Vt. 281, 69 A. 761 (1908).
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official of a corporation is disqualified to hear a case in which the
corporation has a pecuniary interest, because his duty to promote the
best interests of the corporation clashes with the impartiality required
of him as a judge. 5 While a corporate official acting as a judge in a
matter concerning the corporation raises many different problems, an
analogy can be drawn for the disqualification of all mayor-judges. A
municipal official undoubtedly has a similar duty to promote the best
interests of the municipality. One of the most important interests of
the municipality is to maintain a strong fiscal position in order to
provide adequate services to the citizenry. Politically, the mayor,
whether a "weak" or "strong" mayor, must attempt to maintain a
low tax rate while providing adequate services, or face the voters'
wrath. The mayor has an opportunity to achieve this goal in an
inoffensive manner by using convictions in the mayor's court to in-
crease the village revenues.
The Ward opinion seems to indicate that there is some due
process line which, if crossed, will result in the disqualification of the
mayor-judge. However, the Ward Court gave no clear guidance in
this matter. The Court did not overrule Dugan or directly answer the
question of whether all mayor's courts are unconstitutional.
Arguably there might be situations when the mayor's interest is
too remote to invoke the Tumey-Ward rationale, or in which the
political considerations for obtaining needed revenue by increasing
convictions in the mayor's court are nonexistent. Unfortunately, the
Court has failed to give any definite guide as to when these situations
might arise. The Ward Court "seems to leave the question open for
future consideration because it merely distinguishes [Ward] ...
from the Dugan case without affirming or disavowing it.""a
The Tumey-Ward rationale requires the disqualification of a
mayor in "[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required
to convict the defendant . . . . 3 It would not be unreasonable to
imagine a mayor being tempted toward conviction and its resulting
revenue to alleviate the community's financial difficulties. Because of
the mayor's unique position as a judicial official and as an executive
and/or a legislative official he cannot help but be a biased judge. The
1 46 Aht. JUR. 2D Judges § 127 (1969). See Appeal of Askounes, 144 Pa. Super. 293, 298,
19 A.2d 846, 848 (1941), which stated that the judge's "membership on the board of trustees
of a college will disqualify him from sitting in a case the outcome of which will affect its
financial affairs .. "
16 42 CIN. L. REv. 367, 374 (1973).
3 273 U.S. at 532.
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positions lead to a conflict of the roles, for the mayor as judge must
seek justice, but the mayor as a community official must attempt to
maintain a strong fiscal position.
IV. THE LACK OF LEGAL TRAINING OF THE NON-LAWYER MAYOR
AS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The defendant in mayor's court is not guaranteed a judge trained
in the law,38 as he is in other Ohio courts.39 This gives rise to several
problems. The mayor must deal with a variety of legal issues that
arise at a criminal hearing, such as: advising the defendant of his
rights, admitting the proper evidentiary matter, and applying the
legal precedents. The criminal defendant who is tried before a mayor
who has no legal training may not receive a fair trial because the non-
lawyer judge is often unable to understand the full impact of these
legal issues.
A. Advising the Criminal Defendant of His Rights
A critical area in a misdemeanor trial is advising the defendant
of his constitutional and statutory rights.4" The judge has the duty to
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.02 (Page 1954) provides that the only qualification for
the office of mayor is that an individual be an elector of the city. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
3503.01 (Page 1972) defines a qualified elector: "[e]very citizen of the United States who is of
the age of eighteen years or over and who has been a resident of the state six months, of the
county thirty days, and of the voting precinct thirty days . . . may vote at all elections."
31 The statutes providing for the qualification of the various state judges require each
judge to have a certain amount of legal training before he can become a member of the bench.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1907.051 (Page 1968, Supp. 1974), provides that every county judge
"shall have been admitted to the practice of law in this state and shall have been for a total of
at least two years preceding his appointment or commencement of his term, engaged in the
practice of law in this state." This section only affects county judges newly elected after
November 1, 1962. There are presently two non-lawyer county court judges in Ohio. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1901.06 (Page 1968, Supp. 1974), provides that each municipal court judge "Shall
have been admitted to the practice of law in this state and shall have been, for a total of at
least six years preceding his appointment or commencement of his term, engaged in the practice
of law in this state." Similar provisions govern the qualifications of judges of the common pleas
courts: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2301.01 (Page 1954, Supp. 1974); courts of appeal, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2501.02 (Page 1954, Supp. 1974); supreme court, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2503.01 (Page 1954, Supp. 1974). To be admitted to the practice of law in Ohio an individual
must be 21 years of age, have earned a bachelor's degree from an accredited college, have
earned a law degree from a law school approved by the ABA, and have passed the Ohio Bar
Exam, OHIO R. Gov. BAR I.
10 Among these rights are: the right to counsel, U.S. CoNST. amend. VI, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), OHIo CONST. art. I, § 10; the right to trial by jury in all cases but
petty offenses, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 10, see note 5 supra; the right of confrontation of witnesses, U.S. CONST.
amend. VI, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 10; the privilege
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properly advise the accused of his rights and to determine if the
defendant has constitutionally waived those rights.4
The very serious and important task of advising the defendant
of his rights and accepting any waiver of these rights is even more
important when the accused is without aid of legal counsel, as is often
the case in mayor's court.42 The accused is entitled to know that he
has certain rights, and this goal can only be achieved if the advising
judge also knows the defendant's rights. In Ohio there is no require-
ment that the mayor-judge have even the vaguest notion of what the
various constitutional and statutory rights are. By contrast, due to the
legal education required of all other Ohio judges,43 they are almost
certain to be familiar with the defendant's rights and with the require-
ments for a constitutionally valid waiver of these rights.
The rebuttal to this argument is that advising the defendant of
his rights is merely to put the defendant on notice, and thus requires
nothing more than merely communicating to the accused that he has
certain rights. Furthermore, petty misdemeanor cases, which com-
prise the bulk of cases decided in mayor's court, do not require strict
adherence to the various constitutional rights for the protection of the
accused and such adherence would only be burdensome to the already
overcrowded court system. The Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Traffic Rules provide for less detailed advice to be given to the ac-
cused who is pleading guilty or no contest to a petty crime rather than
a serious misdemeanor or felony.44
against self-incrimination, U.S. CONsT. amend. V, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), OHIo
CONST. art. I, § 10; the right of the accused to demand the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him, U.S. CON sT. amend. VI, OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10, and the right to
have compulsory process to procure the attendance ofwitnesses in behalf of the defendant, U.S.
CONST. amend. V, OHIO CoN s. art. I, § 10. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals in
Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 278 N.E.2d 374 (1972), concluded that in a
misdemeanor trial the defendant is entitled to the same rights afforded to a felony defendant.
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 10 (C), and OHIO TRAF. R. 8 (D) require that the defendant similarly be
advised of his constitutional right.
41 A guilty plea operates as a waiver of certain constitutional rights, Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 at 242 (1969). A waiver of constitutional rights must be voluntarily, intelligently,
and knowingly made, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970). Cleveland v. Whip-
key, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 83, 278 N.E.2d 374, 378 (1972).
11 In an observation of the Upper Arlington, Ohio mayor's court, only two defendants
were represented by counsel out of apprxoimately thirty defendants.
3 See note 39 supra.
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 11(C) provides that
(1) Where in a felony case the defendant is unrepresented by counsel the court
shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant, after being
readvised that he has the right to be represented by retained counsel, or . . . by
appointed counsel, waives this right.
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of
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While there is some confusion as to how extensive the constitu-
tional rights are in a misdemeanor trial, the accused is guaranteed
certain basic constitutional rights.45 The judge in a petty case may be
called upon to decide if a defendant has waived his rights within the
constitutional framework. This task requires an understanding of
these constitutional rights.
B. Applying the Rules of Evidence
If the accused invokes his right to plead not guilty, he is entitled
to a fair trial and the procedural safeguards offered by the rules of
evidence. The law of evidence is a product of the jury system.46 Even
if it is acknowledged that, since a mayor cannot preside over a jury
trial 7 and therefore the rules of evidence should be relaxed, a certain
no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant
personally and:
(a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with under-
standing of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved,
and, if applicable, that he is eligible for probation.
(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of
his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea
may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea
he is waiving his right to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the
state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot
be compelled to testify against himself.
OHio R. CRIM. P. 11(D), relating to misdemeanor cases involving serious offenses, provides
that
the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept
such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and informing him of the
effect of the pleas of guilty, no contest, and not guilty and determining that he is
making the plea voluntarily. Where the defendant is unrepresented by counsel the
court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant, after being
readvised that he has the right to be represented by retained counsel, or . . . by
appointed counsel, waives this right.
With regard to petty offenses Ohio Crim. R. II(E) provides that "the court may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas without first informing
the defendant of the effect of the pleas of guilty, no contest, and not guilty." The defendant
does not have to be readvised of his right to retained counsel or, if he is unable to obtain counsel,
to appointed counsel.
OHIO TRAF. R. 10(C) and (D) provide for similar advice to be given to the defendant in a
serious misdemeanor case and in a petty misdemeanor case, analogous to the Criminal Rules.
0 29 Ohio App. 2d at 84, 278 N.E.2d at 378. In some instances the rights in petty and
serious offenses may differ in certain respects, e.g., the right to a jury trial in a petty offense is
not constitutionally guaranteed as in serious offenses. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). See Section VI infra, for a discussion of the right to counsel in a misdemenaor case.
'6 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 60 at 137 (1945).
' See note 7 supra.
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minimum level of competency should nevertheless be required of the
mayor-judge. 8 The purpose of evidence is to inform the court of the
material facts that are involved in the controversy so that the truth
may be determined and a fair result reached." The rules of evidence
have developed in order to elicit the truth from the evidence produced
in the case. 0 This can occur only if the presiding official is aware of
the rules of evidence and applies them properly.
In the traditional adversary proceeding the defendant's counsel
will object to the violation of the rules of evidence by the prosecution,
but in the mayor's court the defendant is often without aid of legal
counsel."' In such a situation the prosecution may be able to elicit
unreliable evidence (e.g., hearsay) from a witness without the defen-
dant and lay mayor being aware of its objectional nature. Such unre-
liable evidence might bias the lay mayor's determination of the case.
In essence, the mayor is fashioning his own rules of evidence, which
may weigh heavily against the defendant." In a criminal prosecution
the burden of proof is on the state;53 this requirement benefits the
defendant. A mayor, untrained in the law, might be unaware of the
great burden cast upon the prosecution. In a criminal hearing, espe-
cially when the case is prosecuted by an attorney rather than a com-
plaining police officer and when the accused is unrepresented by
counsel, the defendant should be given every possible opportunity for
a fair hearing. The only protection the defendant has is a competent
judge to prevent violations of the rules of evidence which would be
detrimental to him.5 4
Arguably the lack of adherence to the rules of evidence might
work to the defendant's advantage, since the accused would not be
11 Cf. McDonald, South Carolina Magistrates: Justice Under a Willow Tree, CIVIL
LIBERTIES, April 1975 at 4. The article contains a general discussion of the legal inequities that
result in trials conducted by lay magistrates.
"1 29 AI. JR. 2D Evidence § 1 (1967).
0 Id.
" See note 42 supra.
52 Cf Columbus Dispatch, April 25, 1975 at 4, col. 3, which reported that the municipal
court judge of Skiatook, Oklahoma refused to accept a not guilty plea of the defendant, James
P. Miller, Jr. Judge Harvey Wilson was quoted as saying, "You're guilty, you'll have to plead
guitty and pay your fine. There will be no trial." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. Il § 958.7 (b),(c) (Supp.
1974), allows the mayor of the community of less than 7,500 to appoint "any suitable and
proper person" to act as judge if there is no attorney residing in the county who is willing to
accept the position. According to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, County and City Data Book 1972,
901 (1973), Skiatook had a population of 2,930 in 1970. There is no record of Harvey Wilson
being admitted to the practice of law in Oklahoma, Frances Kennemer, Deputy Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, May 7, 1975.
" In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
51 Contra, Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 at 775 (Ky. 1973).
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subject to the rules of evidence. Since the defendant is likely to be as
legally unsophisticated as the lay judge, this might cause the judge
to favor the defendant in his determination. The accused might be
able to present wholly irrelevant but emotionally charged testimony
and sway the judge who is not concerned with the requirements of
evidence. Thus, the advantages that the prosecution might gain in a
tribunal that does not adhere to the law of evidence may be balanced
by similar advantages afforded to the defendant.
Nevertheless, the mayor's awareness of the rules of evidence is
necessary. Strict adherence to the rules need not be rigidly enforced,5
but the mayor should be aware of what evidence to admit and the
weight to be given to that evidence. The mayor in making this deter-
mination has a duty to seek the truth from the various facts presented
to him. A layman can not be expected to adequately apply the rules
of evidence to aid him in his determination of the truth.
C. Understanding the Importance of Legal Precedent in a Criminal
Trial
The typical layman is unfamiliar with the rules of law that have
emerged over the years or that have been dictated by statute which
often guide the lawyer-judge in his determination." Without an un-
derstanding of the importance of legal precedent the lay judge is
capable of applying only his notion of right and wrong to reach his
decision.57 This results in deciding every case as a unique proposition
without relying on precedent and relevant statutes to guide him to a
correct decision.
There are many legal issues which may arise at a trial in mayor's
court which would require the application of various rules of law. A
first amendment issue relating to free speech can easily arise in
mayor's court. 8 A layman is not likely to be aware of the numerous
federal and state decisions relating to the scope of the first amend-
ment. Another area of concern is the suppression of evidence illegally
seized. It is highly complex law and a layman is not likely to be aware
of or have an understanding of court decision relating to this area of
the law. The mayor might also be called upon to determine whether
a statute covers the defendant's conduct, without having the ability
51 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1 (1967). See Levin & Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in
Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 905 (1971).
"' Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 118 at
128 (1927).
"7 Id. at 129.
" See Bowling Green v. Lodico, II Ohio St. 2d 135, 228 N.E.2d 325 (1967).
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to properly interpret the language of the statute. The protections
afforded by these rules are likely to be absent in a trial where the
judge is unaware of them due to his lack of legal training.
It could be argued that these propositions are de minimis. Since
many of the cases tried in the mayor's court involve petty misdemean-
ors, the legal complications presented by precedent are relatively
minor. In a petty offense the judge is usually not confronted with
constitutional issues or the construction of statutes. Also, even if th
accused is charged with a serious misdemeanor, in which he is entitled
to a jury and has the option to proceed directly to a court of record,
he waives his "right" to a qualified and competent judge by electing
to remain in mayor's court.
However, legal precedent, criminal law, and constitutional law
are all vital elements in a criminal trial. The constitutional require-
ments of a fair trial require the implementation of these elements.
Because of the general lack of legal training required of the mayor,
such protections can not exist in mayor's court.
D. A Fair Trial Requires a Judge Trained in the Law
Due process of law is an important element that must be met in
all courts, no matter how minor the court. "[T]here is a serious
question whether the part-time lay judge can appreciate or compre-
hend the complex procedural requirements of due process."5 When
an individual may lose his liberty or property because of an adverse
decision in a criminal proceeding, strict adherence to the various legal
and procedural elements of due process should be required. The emi-
nent Roscoe Pound, commenting on the lack of legal qualifications
of lay administrative judges, said: "They are likely to have the lay-
man's idea that the decision is an easy task involving no acquired
expertness through training and experience and to be conscientiously
unconscious of what the lawyer soon learns, namely, that there are
two sides to every case." 0
Recently the California Supreme Court in Gorden v. Justice
Court" recognized that even in a misdemeanor trial complicated is-
sues of law and procedure are likely to be involved which a lay judge
cannot be assumed to comprehend.62 The court concluded that,
11 Comment, Constitutional Challenge to the Justice of the Peace Court in Mississippi,
44 Miss. L. J. 996, 1006 (1973).
60 A.B.A.J. 664, 670 (1941).
11 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
12 12 Cal. 3d at 328, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635. Unlike the Ohio situation a
lay candidate for justice of the peace in California is required to pass a three hour exam
covering a wide area of the law.
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"[slince our legal system regards denial of counsel as a denial of
fundamental fairness, it logically follows that the failure to provide
a judge qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal arguments
likewise must be considered a denial of due process."63
As Roscoe Pound noted, there are two sides to every issue; not
all state courts agree with the Gorden court's conclusion. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Ditty v. Hampton4 rejected the idea that
the right to counsel leads to the conclusion that a defendant has a
right to be tried before an attorney-judge in criminal cases. The court
reasoned that the right to counsel was for the purpose of protecting
the defendant from his adversary the prosecution, rather than from
the nonadversary, neutral and impartial judge.65
Nevertheless, a criminal defendant is entitled to due process of
law in all steps of the judicial process of a criminal proceedings. Due
process of law requires a minimum standard of judicial competence
of a mayor when he is exercising a judicial function. "[A]n assump-
tion that the office is not so important as to require judicial knowl-
edge ignores basic realities of judicial administration." 6 While a con-
viction in mayor's court is not final since an appeal from the court
may be taken as a trial de novo,67 "[a]n undue burden is placed upon
a defendant when he must bear the expense and inconvenience of an
appeal in order to receive a fair trial before a qualified and impartial
judge."68 The United States Supreme Court in Ward also rejected the
"procedural safeguards" offered by a trial de novo, holding this did
not guarantee a fair trial in mayor's courts.6 9
V. THE LACK OF LEGAL TRAINING OF THE NON-LAWYER MAYOR
AS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
The General Assembly of Ohio has made the determination that
all Ohio judges except the mayor, fulfill certain educational standards
including the possession of a law degree.7" The General Assembly has
63 12 Cal. 3d at 332, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638. See Section VI, infra.
64 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 885 (1973); Ditty was reaffirmed
in North v. Russell, 516 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1974), vacated and remanded, 419 U.S. 1085 (1974),
aff'd, No. 74-723 (Ky., March 21, 1975), probable jurisdiction noted, 422 U.S. 1040 (1975);
see note 79, infra.
490 S.W.2d at 775. See Section VI, infra.
0 Comment, Constitutional Challenge to the Justice of the Peace Court in Mississippi,
44 Miss. L. J. 996, 1007 (1973).
11 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1905.25 (Page 1974), provides that "[a]n appeal from mayor's
court to the municipal court or county court shall proceed as a trial de novo."
" Comment, Constitutional Challenge to the Justice of the Peace Court in Mississippi,
44 Miss. L. J. 996, 1007 (1973).
11 409 U.S. at 61-62.
70 See note 39 supra.
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also made the determination that admission to the state bar is not
the sole criterion to allow a person to function as a judge; in addition,
the prospective judge must have actively practiced law in Ohio for
two to six years, depending on the court to which he is seeking elec-
tion.7 These requirements are an indication that legal education and
legal experience are deemed essential to the administration of justice
by the legislature. The justice that should be administered in the
mayor's court is no different from the justice administered in a mu-
nicipal court; both courts often decide similar types of cases. As
previously discussed the lay mayor is not likely to be able to imple-
ment fully the procedural and substantive elements necessary for a
fair trial. However, if the defendant is tried in a municipal court,
these legal elements are more likely to be implemented. The result is
the quality of justice available to the defendant depends principally
on where he is tried. This result denies the defendant equal protection
under the law.
In applying the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has
utilized different tests to determine if the legislation in question is
constitutional. Under the traditional "rational basis" test the classifi-
cation established by the state (those persons tried in mayor's courts)
must relate to a legitimate government purpose.72 The "strict scru-
tiny" test is utilized when fundamental rights are in question.73 This
standard requires that the legislation in question must promote a
compelling state interest.74 Finally, in criminal cases that involve the
equal protection clause, the Court has often utilized a test which
prohibits "unreasonable distinctions" among classes of criminal de-
fendants.15
Providing the citizenry with a local forum for the administration
of justice undoubtedly meets all of the equal protection tests. The
mayor's courts do provide the populace with some form of local
"justice." However, under all the tests, the inequities caused by a trial
conducted by a non-attorney outweigh the "benefits" of a locally
available form of justice. The guarantee of a fair trial is "the most
fundamental of all freedoms ' 7 and a fair trial is a basic requirement
of due process.77 No legitimate governmental purpose is served by
71 Id.
72 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
73 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
74 Id.
71 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971).
11 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
7 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1965).
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 889 (1975)
granting the accused a less fair trial solely because of geographic
convenience. Perhaps "strict scrutiny" is the proper test since the
fundamental right of a fair trial is involved." Under this analysis the
state would be unable to show a compelling state interest that would
justify infringing on the right to a fair trial merely for local conveni-
ence. There is also an "unreasonable distinction" made among the
class of defendants who are tried for misdemeanor violations in Ohio.
The accident of geography is the controlling factor as to whether the
accused may be tried by a non-lawyer rather than a lawyer. The
location of the trial bears no -legitimate, compelling or reasonable
relation to the differentiation among defendants charged with the
same offense, and cannot justify the denial of a legally trained judge
to those defendants tried in a mayor's court.
VI. THE RIGHT TO A LAWYER-JUDGE?
The United States Supreme Court has not directly decided the
issue of whether a person has the right to be tried by a lawyer-judge
in criminal matters (the Court will have an opportunity to decide this
issue in a case that was recently argued, North v. Russell"). The
position taken in this Note is that a lawyer-judge is necessary for the
administration of criminal justice. The Court has rendered decisions
concerning the extent of the right to counsel in a criminal trial. These
decisions may support or undercut the "right" to a lawyer-judge in a
misdemeanor hearing.
The Court decided in Gideon v. Wainwright"0 that in a felony
trial, in which the defendant is unable to obtain counsel, counsel must
be provided to him unless he waives this right." This logic was ex-
panded in Argersinger v. Hamlin,82 which involved a misdemeanor
case in which the accused was without aid of counsel and sentenced
to jail. The Court's reasoning was rather broad, stating that "[t]he
requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in
a petty-offense prosecution"83 and "the problems associated with
"' But cf Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625, 242 N.E.2d 802 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 120 (1969). The New York Court of Appeals utilized the "rational
basis" test to uphold state legislation that denied public employees the right to a jury trial in
contempt proceedings.
79 516 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1974), vacated and remanded, 419 U.S. 1085 (1974), affd, No.
74-723 (Ky. March 21, 1975), probable jurisdiction noted, 422 U.S. 1040 (1975); argued Dec.
9, 1975, 44 U.S.L.W. 3357 (Dec. 16, 1975). The Kentucky court of appeals in affirming North
relied on their decision in Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (1972).
'o 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 339-40.
'2 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
91 Id. at 33.
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misdemeanors and petty offenses often require the presence of coun-
sel to insure a fair trial." 4 The holding, however, was rather narrow.
The Court held that the right to appointed counsel, in a misdemeanor
trial, exists only if the accused is sentenced to jail."5
It would seem to follow that an attorney-judge would be neces-
sary in those cases in which the accused had the right to appointed
counsel, so that the judge would be able to understand counsel's
arguments. Anything less would diminish the full effectiveness of
counsel. Since legal counsel is often essential to a fair trial, 6 a lawyer-
judge, who by his training is able to understand the legal arguments
of counsel, is often essential to a fair trial.
The determination that the right to an attorney-judge exists
when there is a right to an appointed counsel would have a significant
impact in Ohio's mayor's courts. Ohio Criminal Rule 44 requires the
appointment of counsel when the defendant is charged with a serious
crime87 and he is unable to obtain retained counsel. In a petty of-
fense,88 Criminal Rule 44 follows the Argersinger holding and pro-
vides that no jail sentence can be imposed unless the accused has legal
counsel or he waives this right.8" Thus, if the right to counsel is to be
of any real value, the defendant must be guaranteed a lawyer-judge
in all cases in which he is charged with a serious crime and he can
not be sentenced to imprisonment unless he was tried by a lawyer-
judge. 0
This line of reasoning still does not guarantee a lawyer-judge to
a defendant who is charged with a petty offense that carries no possi-
bility of imprisonment. This type of offense makes up the bulk of the
mayor's courts' case load. However, the absence of legal counsel does
not end the inquiry as to the necessity for a lawyer judge. If a lawyer
is not present at the trial, the defendant must turn to the judge in the
hope that he will preserve his rights and implement the requirements
necessary for a fair trial.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37. There is a right to retained counsel in criminal hearings. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI and OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT 28 (1973).
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 2 defines a serious offense as "any felony, and any misdemeanor for
which the penalty prescribed by law includes confinement for more than six months."
I OHIO R. CRIM. P. 2 defines a petty offense as "a misdemeanor other than a serious
offense."
" The Ohio Traffic Rules provides that the right to counsel as provided in the Criminal
Rules apply in Traffic cases, OHIO TRAF. R. 10(C) and (D).
o The California supreme court in Gorden requires that the right to an attorney-judge
exists when a possible sentence involves imprisonment, 12 Cal. 3d at 334, 515 P.2d at 79, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law . . . .He is unfamiliar with the rules
of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence,
or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible."
Traditionally the judge is regarded as the silent, neutral and
impartial presiding officer whose only function is to rule on motions
and objections made by counsel. However, he is also charged with the
administration of justice. This burden is increased when the accused
is unrepresented by counsel. A lawyer-judge has the expertise neces-
sary to guarantee the defendant that his constitutional rights92 will be
protected even if he is without aid of legal counsel. Therefore, in a
criminal trial where the defendant has no right to an appointed attor-
ney, a lawyer-judge is necessary for the full implementation of fair-
ness and equality.
This argument does not exclude the "right" to an attorney-judge
when the accused has a right to appointed counsel. The right to a
lawyer-judge is an absolute right in all criminal cases. In trials where
the defendant is guaranteed appointed counsel, the full effectiveness
of counsel can only be achieved when the judge, by his legal training,
is able to understand the legal arguments of counsel. In cases where
the accused is not guaranteed appointed counsel or he does not have
retained counsel, the attorney-judge is necessary since he is often the
only person in the courtroom capable of protecting and understand-
ing the constitutional rights of the accused and assuring him a fair
trial.
The implementation of this "right" would not be as burdensome
to the local sytem of justice as the full implementation of the right
to appointed counsel might be. While the latter would require that
each defendant would be represented by counsel, the former right
would only require that each criminal court would be presided over
by an attorney-judge.
VII. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE MAYOR'S COURTS
The abolition of mayor's courts would not imply that the citi-
zens' needs for a convenient and local form of justice would be over-
looked. Nor would the abolition necessarily increase the case load of
the already overburdened courts.9 3 A type of "circuit riding" munici-
" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
92 See notes 41-42 supra.
g3 35 Ohio St. 2d at 84, 298 N.E.2d at 536.
NOTES
pal court judge has been suggested by commentators.94 The statutes
governing the municipal courts allow the court to hold sessions any-
where within its jurisdiction.95 Depending on the particular municipal
court, its jurisdiction may be county-wide, or confined to a particular
township or city.9" In the more populous counties a judge could travel
to different geographic sections of the county periodically to preside
over cases now handled by the mayor's courts. In counties where the
judges are already overworked this could be accomplished by provid-
ing for an additional judicial seat; the elected judge's major function
would be to "circuit ride." In counties with a less congested court
calendar the duties of the "circuit rider" could be shared by all the
judges on a rotating basis. In counties with few municipal court
judges, "circuit riding" could be accomplished by a judge on a part-
time basis (e.g., in the evening once or twice a week). If a county had
no municipal courts or had municipal courts with a very limited
geographic jurisdiction, the alternative would be to shift the burden
of "circuit riding" to the part-time county court judges."
The Traffic Rules provide another alternative to the mayor's
court. Traffic Rule 14 allows a court to appoint referees, who must
be attorneys-at-law, to perform many of the preliminary proceedings
in traffic cases.99 In certain cases the referee may decide contested
traffic cases.99 The use of referees could be extended to all types of
misdemeanor cases that are presently decided in mayor's court. The
increased reliance on referees coupled with required "circuit riding"
of these officials would be a viable alternative to mayor's courts.
The Court in Ward implied another alternative to the present
mayor's court system. The Court stated that it "intimate[d] no view
that it would be unconstitutional to permit a mayor. . . to serve in
essentially a ministerial capacity in a traffic or ordinance violation
case to accept a free and voluntary plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
a forfeiture of collateral, or the like." 1°0 Ohio supreme court Justice
Corrigan, in his dissent in Brockman, also implied a similar alterna-
"1 Interview with Allan H. Whaling, Director of the Ohio Judicial Conference in Colum-
bus, Ohio, January 21, 1975; interview with Joseph Yearling, Police Prosecutor of Upper
Arlington, in Columbus, Ohio, April 3, 1975; interview with Richard Moore, Mayor of Upper
Arlington, in Upper Arlington, Ohio, April 4, 1975.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.021 (Page 1968). See McGovern, 1959 Legislation Af-
fecting the Minor Courts, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 625 (1959).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.02 (Page 1974).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1907.01 et seq. (Page 1968).
" OHIO TRAF. R. 14, allows the referee to receive pleas, "statements in explanation and
for mitigation of sentence and of recommending penalty to be imposed .. "
11 Id., the referee can only hear contested cases when the defendant consents in writing.
100 409 U.S. at 62, n.2.
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tive.101 Ministerial functions are those that are precisely defined and
leave nothing to the discretion or judgment of the acting official,'
while a judicial function requires that the acting official exercise
discretion or judgment."3 Vesting the mayor with a ministerial func-
tion in certain traffic and ordinance violation cases is an alternative
to the present situation, constitutionally permissible within the hold-
ing of Ward. This alternative is further supported by the Court in
Shadwick v. Tampa,t"4 in which a layman clerk of courts was allowed
to perform the limited "judicial" function of issuing arrest warrants
so long as he was a "neutral and detached" official and capable of
determining if probable cause existed." 5 Thus it follows that it would
be constitutionally permissible for a layman to perform the minis-
terial function of accepting guilty pleas or fines in petty cases. This
suggestion is a compromise between the present mayor's court and
the complete elimination of the mayor's court.
Traffic Rule 13 provides for the establishment of a Traffic Viola-
tion Bureau in which the clerk of courts"0 6 may accept pleas of guilty
and payment of fines and court costs.107 The violation bureau may
dispose of all traffic violations except certain serious offenses.," The
"1 35 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 298 N.E.2d at 537.
'1 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judges § 83 (1969).
I' ld.
'o 407 U.S. 345 (1972). See Comments, The Supreme Court and the Limited Jurisdiction
Courts-Ward and Shadwick, I J. SYSTEM J. 56 (1974).
"1 407 U.S. at 350.
.08 OHIO TRAF. R. 13(A), provides that in the absence of a clerk, "the court shall appoint
any appropriate person of the municipality or county in which the court sits" to perform the
duties of the clerk with regard to the Violations Bureau. The duties of the clerk of courts are
ministerial in nature, see Warwick v. State, 25 Ohio St. 21 (1874); State ex rel. Glass v.
Chapman, 67 Ohio St. 1, 65 N.E. 154 (1902).
I'l OHIO TRAF. R. 13(A), provides that the "violations bureau shall accept appearance,
waiver of trial, plea of guilty and payment of fine and costs for offenses within its authority."
'1 OHIO TRAF. R. 13(B) allows the violation bureau to dispose of any traffic violation
except:
(1) Indictable offenses; (2) Offenses resulting in serious accident; (3) Operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, or permit-
ting another person, who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, to
operate a motor vehicle owned by the defendant or in his custody or control; (4)
Reckless driving; (5) Leaving the scene of an accident; (6) Driving while under
suspension or revocation of driver's license; (7) Driving without being licensed to
drive; (8) Exceeding the speed limit by more than twenty miles per hour; (9) A second
moving traffic offense within a twelve-month period; and (10) Failure to stop and
remain standing upon meeting or overtaking a school bus stopped on the highway
for the purpose of receiving or discharging a school child; (11) Willfully eluding or
fleeing a police officer; (12) Drag racing; (13) Any offense otherwise eligible for
processing by a traffic violations bureau where the officer, by reason of unusual
circumstances, marks the ticket as "personal appearance required."
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Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide for a similar procedure in
minor misdemeanor cases in which the penalty does not exceed one
hundred dollars.109
An expansion of Traffic Rule 13 and Criminal Rule 4.1 that
would allow the mayor to perform the ministerial duties of the clerk
of courts of accepting pleas of guilty and fines would be a reasonable
alternative to the present mayor's court system. An individual who
opted to plead guilty and pay a fine would not have to make a court
appearance. If an individual decided to or was required to proceed
to court on the charge, he would proceed to the appropriate county
or municipal court. The defendant, if he proceeded to trial, would be
guaranteed a neutral and legally competent judge to decide his case
in a convenient forum. If the defendant did not proceed to trial, he
could pay his fine to the local violations bureau in which the mayor
(or other appropriate individual such as the village clerk) would per-
form a ministerial function as delegated by the Traffic Rules and the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The coupling of judicial "circuit rid-
ing" and a violations bureau in communities that are now served by
mayor's courts would eliminate many of the present defects involved
in a trial in mayor's court.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The mayor's courts should be abolished, since their existence is
detrimental to the modern American legal system. First, the mayor,
whether an executive or legislative official, has an inherent pecuniary
interest in obtaining fines derived from convictions in his court. The
mayor has a duty to the community to maintain fiscal soundness; a
part of fiscal stability may be attributable to the fines imposed by the
mayor. A mayor could reasonably be expected to lean toward convic-
tion in order to preserve his political office and maintain a strong
fiscal position for the community.
Second, a criminal defendant, whether charged with a misde-
meanor or a felony, is entitled to a minimum level of due process and
equal protection. A situation in which a defendant may forfeit his
liberty or property entitles him to a judge who is aware of the com-
plex elements of due process and equal protection. A lay mayor
cannot be expected to be aware of the legal complexities involved.
When tried before a mayor uneducated in law, the accused is more
likely to have an unfair trial than if his case were determined by a
10io OIO R. CRIM. P. 4.1.
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judge educated in law. Such an unfair situation should not be toler-
ated.
The mayor's courts should be totally abolished."1 The void cre-
ated by the abolition of the mayor's courts could be filled by some
form of judicial "circuit riding" and the establishment of violation
bureaus in the affected communities. This would allow the people of
Ohio a convenient form of justice, and at the same time they would
be guaranteed a "neutral and detached" judge who by his legal educa-
tion would be able to afford a defendant a fair trial.
John J. Chernoski
,,o A bill has been recently introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives to abolish
mayor's courts, H.B. 786, 111th General Assembly, (1975).
